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Warren, Jr. (Joseph) v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 77 (Sep. 27, 2018)
(en banc)1
CRIMINAL LAW: OPTIONS TO APPEAL JUSTICE COURT DETERMINATIONS
Summary
The Court determined that NRS § 177.015(1)(a) authorizes the State to appeal from a
justice court dismissal of a criminal complaint because such a decision is a final judgment, and
that NRS § 178.562(2) does not limit the State’s remedies to appeal a justice court’s decision to
dismiss a criminal complaint because this provision does not mention final judgment.
Background
The State filed a criminal complaint against Joseph Warren, Jr., charging him with four
felonies and two gross-misdemeanors. At the preliminary hearing for these charges, the justice
court dismissed the complaint because the State’s evidence was based on hearsay, so it lacked
probable cause. The State then moved for leave to file an information by affidavit or a grand jury
indictment, which was denied under NRS § 173.035.
The State also appealed to the district court from the dismissal of the complaint. Warren
moved to dismiss the State’s appeal, arguing that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction because
the only remedies available on dismissal are a motion for leave to file an information by affidavit
or a grand jury indictment, and (2) no statute permitted the State’s appeal. The district court
concluded it had jurisdiction over the appeal under NRS § 177.015(1)(a) and denied Warren’s
motion. Further, it concluded that the justice court erred in dismissing the complaint and remanded.
Warren petitioned for writ of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition to the Court, where he
challenged the district court’s jurisdiction over the State’s appeal. The Court transferred the
petition to the Court of Appeals,2 which held that the district court had jurisdiction under the
remedies in NRS § 178.562(2). Warren then petitioned the Court for review, which was granted.3
Discussion
A writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy granted when a lower court has exceeded its
jurisdiction with no available remedy to an aggrieved party. 4 Thus, Warren’s petition was
appropriate because his argument presented an important issue pertaining to the appellate
jurisdiction of the district court and there was no other recourse available to him. He argued that
no law authorizes an appeal from a justice court’s dismissal of a criminal complaint,5 and that the
State’s only recourse was a motion for leave to file an information by affidavit or a grand jury
indictment.
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NRS § 177.015(1)(a) provides that either the state or a criminal defendant may appeal “[t]o
the district court of the county from a final judgment of the justice court," so the plain language of
the statute vests appellate jurisdiction in the district court over the final judgment of a justice court.6
The question then became whether a justice court dismissing a criminal complaint constitutes a
final judgment. A final judgment "disposes of all issues and leaves nothing for future
consideration."7 In Sandstrom v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, the Court held that NRS
§ 177.015(1)(a) granted the district court appellate jurisdiction from a justice court’s dismissal of
a criminal complaint.8
Warren countered that the crime in Sandstrom was a misdemeanor, so the Court’s holding
is limited to misdemeanors. But the Sandstrom opinion does not turn on whether a complaint
alleges a felony or misdemeanor; it turns on if the justice court made a final judgment ruling. NRS
§ 177.015(1)(a) also does not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies; it is concerned only
with whether the justice court made a final judgment. Therefore, the Court concluded that a justice
court dismissing a criminal complaint is a final judgment because it leaves nothing left for the
justice court to consider.
Warren contended that NRS § 178.562(2) limits the state’s remedies. NRS § 178.562(2)
states "[t]he discharge of a person accused upon preliminary examination is a bar to another
complaint against the person for the same offense, but does not bar the finding of an indictment or
filing of an information." This provision limits the State’s means for additional prosecution for the
same offense. But these are new cases. They do not alter the final judgment of the justice court’s
dismissal. The plain language of NRS § 178.562(2) does not mention final judgment.
Conclusion
The Court held that, under NRS § 177.015(1)(a), the State may appeal justice court’s
dismissal of a criminal complaint because such a decision is a final judgment, and NRS
§ 178.562(2) does not limit the State’s remedies to appeal because this provision does not apply to
final judgments. Moreover, it held that the district court did not exceed it jurisdiction on appeal.
Accordingly, the Court denied Warren’s petition.
CHERRY, J. with whom PICKERING, J. agrees, dissenting:
The State’s only available remedies to appeal a justice court’s dismissal are those listed in
NRS § 178.562(2), which states that "[t]he discharge of a person accused upon preliminary
examination is a bar to another complaint against the person for the same offense, but does not bar
the finding of an indictment or filing of an information." Crucially, this provision does not mention
an appeal from a justice court order dismissing charges. Therefore, the dismissal of felony charges
is not final because the State may still pursue charges in either an information or in an indictment,
thereby granting the state “future consideration.” The Sandstrom decision is distinguishable
because that case involved misdemeanor charges that may do not apply under NRS § 178.562(2).
The government should not be given multiple bites at the apple for felony dismissals. For
example, in Cranford v. Smart the Court recognized that NRS § 173.035(2) safeguards against
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error and is not a device for a prosecutor to satisfy deficiencies in evidence at a preliminary
hearing.9 Similarly, in Maes v. Sheriff the Court held that a new proceeding for the same offense,
by either indictment or information, is not permitted when the complaint is dismissed due to the
prosecutor’s failure to comply with procedural rules.10 The majority’s opinion does not address
the finality of a justice court’s decision to bind over some charges and dismiss others. Judicial
resources will thus be wasted if one district court has to take an appeal and another gets the bound
over charges.
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